I associate myself with my friend’s remarks before

he makes them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

holding this hearing which is going to give us an update on our

country’s efforts to convince the North Koreans to abandon their

dangerous pursuit of nuclear weapons and the path that they are

on.

I am anxious to hear from our witnesses today, particularly Secretary

Kelly.

At the recent third round of talks, the United States, for the first

time in my understanding, put forward a reasonably comprehensive

and detailed road map for how the crisis might be resolved.

The U.S. plan reportedly offers various incentives to North Korea:

multilateral security assurances, fuel oil, sanctions relief, and the

promise for eventual diplomatic normalization, provided—a big caveat—

that North Korea pledges to verifiably dismantle its nuclear

programs and then follows through on that commitment.

I must note, Mr. Chairman, that the United States has not presented

any proposal addressing North Korea’s export of ballistic

missiles, but perhaps that will come at a later date.

North Korea promised to study the U.S. proposal and also presented

a freeze proposal of its own.

Obviously, an awful lot of hard work remains to be done if we

are to reach out and get accord here, and it is not clear, for instance,

in my view how any deal would be verified and by whom.

North Korea still has not admitted to the existence of an uranium

enrichment program, a program that has to be abandoned if we are

to forge this new relationship.

But the exchange of views in Beijing represented progress in my

view, and I hope we can now get to the real meat of these negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, it has been more than 3 years since the Secretary

of State proclaimed the United States’ intention to ‘‘pick up where

the Clinton administration left off’’ and work to eliminate North

Korea’s—and that is a quote ‘‘pick up where the Clinton administration

left off’’ and work to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program

and to curtail its destabilizing export of ballistic missile technology.

Unfortunately, the White House overruled Secretary Powell and

adopted a posture in my view of benign neglect. Even after learning

of North Korea’s attempts to develop uranium enrichment capacity

in the summer of 2002, the administration took more than

2 years to resolve its internal divisions and settle on an approach

for dealing with North Korea. North Korea has used this time apparently

to quadruple its stockpile of plutonium, and therefore perhaps

its nuclear arsenal, progressing from an estimated one to two

nuclear weapons to perhaps as many as eight or more. North Korea

has been busy modernizing and upgrading its ballistic missile force,

although it has not flight-tested any new long-range missiles. The

bottom line is that we now confront a much more dangerous adversary

than we did in 2001.

I am not at all certain—and I want to make the point clearly.

A little humility is in order here. I am not certain that if the administration

listened to your suggestions and mine and others’ to

do what they finally have done, have bilateral discussions with

North Korea, which was proposed over 2 years ago by this committee,

that we would necessarily be in any better shape. I do not

know that. I cannot look back and suggest that. But I am certain

that the approach taken was not productive.

But we are where we are. As former Defense Secretary William

Perry reminds us, we must deal with North Korea as it is, not as

we would wish it to be.

So I commend the administration for finally putting together a

decent proposal to test North Korea’s intentions, and I hope North

Korea will respond positively at the next round of talks scheduled

in September.

Fortunately, North Korea’s neighbors share a commitment of

achieving a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, and I am pleased that

the administration has begun to listen more closely to the advice

that has been offered, consistently offered, by the South Korean

and Japanese allies and by our Russian and Chinese negotiating

partners. Together we might convince North Korea to change its

course, although I am not betting next year’s tuition on that. I understand

this is going to be very difficult.

Mr. Chairman, I hope North Korea will not squander this chance

to improve its relations with its neighbors, to trade false security

offered by its nuclear weapons for a very real security that would

come from integration into one of the world’s most dynamic economic

regions, and normalization of relations with South Korea,

Japan, and the United States.

Convincing North Korea to completely and verifiably dismantle

its nuclear weapons program and its missile program is not going

to be easy. North Korea is a weak and isolated state. The North’s

leaders consider weapons to be the ultimate guarantor of the regime’s

survival, and they are obviously reluctant to give them up.

But in reality, the North’s nuclear program is a giant albatross

around its neck, a waste of resources, strains relations with its

neighbors, and jeopardizes the regional peace and security. I hope

that the leadership of North Korea will come to realize, through

the multilateral talks now underway, that North Korea will choose

a path of peace and integration over a path of confrontation and

isolation, although I am not prepared, as I said, to bet tuition on

that.

I thank the chairman for his dedication to this issue, look forward

to hearing the witnesses, and am delighted that we have at

least moved to this point where there is a prospect of knowing

what the full offer on the table is with us for North Korea. Again,

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I look forward

to hearing our witnesses.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

There is a security dialog going on, obviously, but it also seems

to be bilateral. The North Koreans and the South Koreans have decided

not to wait around, and the North and the Japanese have apparently

decided not to wait for outcomes. I mean, they are bilateral.

The Prime Minister of Japan has indicated he hopes to have

normalization of relations—correct me if I am wrong—with North

Korea within a year, if I am not mistaken. I think that is what I

heard. And the South Koreans have stepped up considerably their

effort to deal bilaterally with the North regardless of what we are

doing. It seems that way anyway. That is the impression.

So my question is, first of all, is the impression correct? And second,

if it is, why is that occurring?

He has begun that. Not he hopes to. He has

begun that.

No, no, but my question is there is a question of

beginning and ending. He has begun it. He said that in order to

end it, he has to—the idea that it is static like our position has

been, static—Korea you must do the following things before we do

anything—that is not the position that has been taken by Tokyo.

It has not been our position?

No, I understand that. But it said they had to do

a number of things. In the past, we made it pretty clear that there

would be no action taken by us at all unless there were certain preconditions

met by North Korea. Now your statement—and correct

me if I am wrong. I may be wrong. It sounds as though that we

are ready to phase in a negotiating structure that we were not prepared

to do before. Or am I wrong about that?

Is something different here? I guess what I am trying to get at

here is it seems as though the atmosphere has changed. Is it because

all of a sudden North Korea has had an epiphany, or is it

because South Korea and Japan are worried you guys are taking

them down a road they do not want to get on and they are going

to go on their own path? I want to just be as blunt as we can here.

What is the deal? What has happened? Has anything changed?

That has always been their position. Right?

I want to talk about the other issues. In your testimony

you included a long list of actions in addition to eliminating

the nuclear weapons program that North Korea has to take to

achieve

Now, that might suggest—and I want to

know whether it does—that even complete nuclear disarmament

would not get North Korea much from the United States other

than security assurances. It also seems a bit different from Dr.

Rice’s statement that

Have you spelled out to the North Koreans just what aspects of

a transformed relationship can be expected from each of these steps

in addition to the process laid out for disarmament of its nuclear

program? In other words, where do diplomatic relations, Nunn-

Lugar-type assistance, trade relations, economic assistance fit into

the various cycles of improvement of all these outstanding issues?

Because it seems to me you are—and I am not suggesting you

should or should not, but you have moved the goalposts a little bit.

Anybody listening to this hearing would assume we are talking

about nuclear disarmament and their missile program. But we are

back to where the President was at the outset, and it is consistent

that at the very beginning he threw in its conventional forces.

There had to be negotiation on that. Now is that a precondition for

any significant change in our position that conventional forces, as

the President said 2 years ago, have to be moved out of range of

Seoul and so on, the redisposition of the conventional forces? What

is the deal here?

Do all of those have to be resolved for us to get

to the point to give security assurances?

Now I got it. So I will conclude, Mr. Chairman.

The U.S. proposal in Beijing—and this is what I am trying to figure

out, whether it really represents any change at all. It seems

as though it did. The Beijing proposal seems to represent a change

from past practices. The administration, based on your testimony

and what I think was said in Beijing at the last meeting, has accepted

the notion that North Korea should be offered explicit incentives

in exchange for a commitment for nuclear disarmament.

Previously the administration has called that blackmail. Previously

in testimony before this committee we were told flatly that

any—any—offer of explicit incentives in return and exchange for

disarmament constituted blackmail.

Now, am I correct? Have there been explicit incentives laid on

the table for the North Koreans that suggest they are available if

they in fact commit to verifiable nuclear disarmament?

Excuse me. What does that mean? I am confused

what you mean. Is an incentive not a reward? Are you making a

distinction between——

Non-aggression is not a reward. Security assurance

is not a reward. When you talk reward, you mean only money.

Security assurance is not a tangible benefit?

No, I got it. I am just trying to understand the

vocabulary. There are revenue enhancements and tax increases.

This is Washington. I am talking to the State Department. I have

got to know the vocabulary, and I understand the vocabulary now.

Thank you.

I have one last question, Mr. Chairman. It has

been prompted by the exchange between Senator Brownback, who

has done an incredible amount of work on this issue. I want to

make sure I understand.

If there was a complete, verifiable disarmament of the nuclear

program, abandonment of a nuclear program by North Korea, as I

understand your statement, we would sanction non-U.S. participation

by the other five that would provide heavy fuel oil, that upon

acceptance by the DPRK of a declaration, the parties, including us,

would provide multilateral security assurances which would become

more enduring as the process proceeded. We would participate

in a study to determine the energy requirements. We would

begin a discussion with others of the steps necessary for lifting economic

sanctions and the steps necessary for removal for the DPRK

from the list of state sponsored terrorism. So they are the things

we would be prepared to do either sign on to others providing and

not object to and what we would participate in considering. Is that

correct?

So these things, as we have proposed it, if it were

accepted, could go forward notwithstanding the fact there was no

alteration of North Korea’s conduct relative to the human rights

abuses cited by my colleague, Senator Brownback.

By the way, I have no doubt that the President

and the Secretary of State and all the administration feels extremely

strongly about these human rights abuses and I have no

doubt that there would be no normalization absent remedying this,

full normalization. But so I am not confused anyway, we are making

a distinction here between the full normalization of relationships

and what would flow from a dismantlement of verifiable assurances

that they were no longer engaged in their nuclear program,

that they are distinct. They may overlap. They could be the

same. But some things can move forward based upon total

verifiable disarmament of nuclear capability, but the whole of the

relationship cannot be mended without other things occurring, as

well as disarmament. Is that a fair statement?

Thank you very much. I will be brief, gentlemen.

I know we have kept you a long time.

Ambassador Pritchard, if the United States does not want to assist

North Korea’s energy sector, are the other parties of the six-

party talks capable of putting an enticing enough package on the

table in return for North Korea’s nuclear disarmament?

The total removal of North Korean?

So then this is a non-starter.

But the bottom line is, are you saying that if Secretary

Kelly’s position, as he stated it here today, were a concrete

position held by this administration, that we will not participate in

providing any of the energy needs of North Korea in return for a

commitment, as I understood it, for total disarmament of the nuclear

capability, then what is there that—I mean, is this not a nonstarter?

Not *x*, *y*, or *z*. Total disarmament is specifically

my question.

That is what I am saying.

Provision of energy. I am just trying to focus specifically.

I asked Secretary Kelly are we prepared to provide for

what I called incentives and he was calling incentives in the nature

of fuel or money. And he said no, we are not prepared to do that.

We will not reward them for doing the right thing, which is to disarm

or end their nuclear program. So if your expert opinion is

there is no reasonable circumstance in which the North Koreans

would be prepared to agree to forego their nuclear program and nuclear

capability because they could not get a sufficient commitment

on their energy needs, absent a U.S. commitment as part of their

energy needs, then this is a non-starter in your view.

No. They said they would do other things. They

said they would consider other commitments.

But at any rate, I do not want to beat this to death. I was just

trying to get a sense of this.

Secretary Carter, you have criticized the Bush policy, as I have

I might add, toward North Korea as being ineffective, lacking carrots

and sticks. How do you view this latest round of negotiations,

particularly the new U.S. proposal as laid out and as articulated

by Secretary Kelly today? Is it good, bad, indifferent? Is it sufficient?

How would you characterize it? Is it still ineffective policy?

Well, that is clear.

Well, they tabled the proposal, though.

How about the present proposal? Is it an effective

proposal? Is it the way you would be moving? Given the circumstances

as they have unfolded in the last 21⁄2 years, notwithstanding

what I happen to believe are your legitimate observations

of the mistakes made and the opportunities lost, notwithstanding

that, tomorrow the President of the United States or a future

President of the United States says to you, Carter, you are in

charge of this policy. What do you do now today? You are in charge.

What do you do relative to North Korea or the five other parties

that is not being done now, or is what has been recently tabled a

sufficient and the appropriate starting point from this day forward?

Would you put forward——

Right. I think we are all in that same position.

Let me conclude with one more question, Mr. Chairman. I remember

early on when the Clinton administration concluded the

original deal, the Agreed Framework, with North Korea talking to

then Secretary of Defense Perry, and I asked him what the most

important element was, and he said staying on the same page as

the South Koreans and the Japanese. It struck me as both self-evident

and elusive, that notion. I had not thought of it in those

terms. I just subconsciously assumed that was necessary, but I did

not think of it in terms of a need for a proactive and sometimes

difficult undertaking.

Are we on the same page now, do you think? Is this administration

now on the same page as Tokyo and Seoul as it relates to

North Korea?

And conversely our ultimate stick does not have

much stick if it is clear that Japan and South Korea do not support

it.

One of the things that I find interesting, after having had the

honor of serving with seven Presidents, is that Presidents or administrations

never like to acknowledge that they are changing

course on anything. But it seems to me that one of the benefits of

the six-party talks has been that the South Koreans and the Japanese

have basically said, hey, we ain’t continuing down this road

you have been going. We are going to start to explore outside these

six-party talks a different and emerging relationship with North

Korea, which it seems to me was a bit of an epiphany for this administration

and brought us to the point we are now of having tabled

something that has the elements that in my view should have

been tabled on day one.

I draw some sense of optimism about not what North Korea will

or will not do, based on the time squandered and how far behind

the 8 ball we are now, but on the notion that at least we seem to

be over, within this administration, what was an extremely difficult

ideological conflict that was taking place which was to even

think about guaranteeing security. No matter what a member of

the ‘‘axis of evil’’ did, they were still per se evil, and how can you

sign an agreement or sign onto a multiparty agreement that provides

security assurances for an evil empire?

That seemed to me to be the ultimate difficulty this administration

faced. They knew any part of any agreement, any possibility

of an agreement with North Korea required a security assurance,

and how do you do that? How do you do that if you have already

decided—whether or not they have nuclear weapons, no matter

what they do, the people in power are bad guys? I hope this reflects

that that debate has been settled within the administration, but I

do not know.

Yes, please respond.